Showing posts with label EPS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EPS. Show all posts

Friday, April 12, 2013

Caught in The Wrong Job?

Merck Today stands at a Juncture where it Requires a Major Overhaul in its Strategic Outlook. Does Kenneth C. Frazier (its current CEO) have what it takes to Guide a Pharma Giant in times of Patent Expiry?

What if you happen to be the recently appointed CEO of a pharma giant in an era of patent expiry & dwindling healthcare policies? And what if, the blockbusters, which generate a quarter of your company’s revenues, are unfortunately poised to go off patent in the next two years? That’s exactly what Kenneth C. Frazier has been struggling since he took over as President & CEO of Merck & Co. from Richard T. Clark on January 1, 2011.

Although facing increased competition, patent losses, and a pipeline of late-stage drugs with poor chances of approval over the last few years, Merck had greatly improved its long-term outlook by acquiring Schering-Plough (for $49 billion in March 2009), but then the challenges remain for Frazier. Raison d’ĂȘtre: Still reeling from the patent loss on its hypertension drugs Cozaar & Hyzaar in early 2010, Merck faces the loss of its next top drug Singulair (for respiratory ailments) in terms of revenue generation in 2012. Considering Singulair represents over 10% of the combined sales of Merck & Schering, the blow will certainly make a big dent on the drugmaker’s topline. Further, Merck faces some remaining legal risk with Vioxx (its popular painkiller). While the majority of plaintiffs participated in the $4.85 billion settlement (in 2008), a few holdouts could ring up additional settlements and significantly hurt Merck’s net profit, which has already witnessed a significant fall, from $12.89 billion in 2009 to $861 million in 2010 (a pathetic 93% drop).

No doubt, indicating a shift in strategy, Frazier, on February 3, 2011, had announced an investment of $8.5 billion in R&D for 2011, but considering that Merck’s efforts to develop a reliable late-stage pipeline have yielded questionable results during the last couple of years, is it really a good bet? “Not really,” feel several critics. By doing so, Frazier has not only compromised the company’s EPS forecast for 2013, but has also offended the Wall Street, which responded back by cutting Merck’s stock price by 2-5% (from the date of announcement). Interestingly, around the same time, Merck’s competitor Pfizer had slashed its R&D budget to $6.5-7 billion from the earlier $8-8.5 billion. And investors awarded the move as the drug giant’s stock price increased by 5-7%.

Such market reaction can perhaps be decoded by expounding upon how this business is evolving. In 2010, the top 10 pharma outfits shelled out a total of $67.41 billion on R&D. In fact, according to statistics compiled by the Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug Development, spending to develop new drugs has been constantly growing over the years. But, what the data also reveals is that after the mid 1990s, new drug approvals have been falling steadily (only 16% win regulatory approval) and research pending has almost doubled in the last one year. This certainly explains the reason for the fall in Merk’s stock price.

If the issue still isn’t clear, then a little flashback might settle the remaining dust. In January 2011, Merck shutdown a study on Vorapaxar and took a $1.7 billion write-down on the drug (a blood thinner which was expected to bring in sales of upto $5 billion). Later in March, it shelved another blood thinner because competitors were way ahead of the development cycle. Further, the 8,000 patient trial of a Staph vaccine was also suspended soon after. All this clearly indicates that Frazier should now be rethinking his strategy. Even if he plans to invest heavily in R&D, it should be focused on a few drugs & executed in a better manner – if not it will continue to fail.
 

Source : IIPM Editorial, 2012.
An Initiative of IIPM, Malay Chaudhuri
 
For More IIPM Info, Visit below mentioned IIPM articles
 

Monday, December 10, 2012

Small package...

...but is the Tata Nano actually going to be a good thing for Tata Motors? The answer to that question is littered with ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’

How expensive (oops, cheap) is Tata Nano? Well, it’s as ‘expensive’ as a CD player fitted into the ultra luxurious Lexus. So, for a Lexus-owner, Tata Nano may just appear to be a toy, but for Ratan Tata and millions of Indians, Nano personifies their reveries – Ratan Tata’s dream to manufacture the world’s cheapest car, and the hope of millions of Indians who always aspired to own and drive a four-wheeler. Though the people’s car was launched on March 23, 2009, it is expected that bookings would commence only by the second week of April. If you thought that manufacturing the world’s cheapest car was the most daunting task, then think again, for achieving break-even looks even more daunting.

As if ominously, Tata Motors suffered a net loss of Rs.2.63 billion for the quarter ending December 2008 – a dreadful decline by 152%. The earning per share (EPS), too, went down to a negative Rs.5.51 per share for the quarter from a healthy Rs.12.95 yoy. Its arch rivals Maruti Suzuki and Hyundai Motors posted healthy numbers at a time when Tata Motors saw a fall of 19% in total sales for the month of February. Will Tata Nano indeed be their saving grace?

At the risk of being daring, the answer to the above question, with a short term perspective, is a big NO! Tata Motors has already invested over Rs.20 billion in the Nano project so far. Although the car would be rolled out in June 2009, it won’t be sooner than 2011 that the company can ‘hope’ to start making profits out of this car. Reason: Nano is a low cost, low-margin car and therefore the company will have to rely on huge volumes to pump in profitability. However, since the manufacturing plant in Gujarat is not ready at the moment, it would be difficult to manufacture more than 3,000-4,000 cars per month initially. “We estimate Tata Motors to sell 50,000 units and 1,50,000 units of Nano in FY’10 and FY’11, respectively. Assuming realisation of Rs.1,00,000 per unit, it will add just Rs.5 billion and Rs.150 billion to the company’s sales in FY ’10 (E) and FY ’11(E) respectively, which is not very significant considering the size of Tata Motors,” points out Vaishali Jajoo, Senior Research Analyst, Angel Broking. So despite the hype that Nano is generating, it would end up spilling more red ink on the balance sheet of Tata Motors in the short run. Trade pundits have predicted that Tata Motors will have to sell at least four to five million cars to break even and make profit. Considering Nano’s rate of production, Tata Motors will be able to reach this figure only by the sixth year of operation, i.e. FY’15. Even the Nano Europa, the European version of Nano, will not be launched before 2011.


Source : IIPM Editorial, 2012.
An Initiative of IIPMMalay Chaudhuri

For More IIPM Info, Visit below mentioned IIPM articles.

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

Small package...

...but is the Tata Nano actually going to be a good thing for Tata Motors? The answer to that question is littered with ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’

How expensive (oops, cheap) is Tata Nano? Well, it’s as ‘expensive’ as a CD player fitted into the ultra luxurious Lexus. So, for a Lexus-owner, Tata Nano may just appear to be a toy, but for Ratan Tata and millions of Indians, Nano personifies their reveries – Ratan Tata’s dream to manufacture the world’s cheapest car, and the hope of millions of Indians who always aspired to own and drive a four-wheeler. Though the people’s car was launched on March 23, 2009, it is expected that bookings would commence only by the second week of April. If you thought that manufacturing the world’s cheapest car was the most daunting task, then think again, for achieving break-even looks even more daunting.

As if ominously, Tata Motors suffered a net loss of Rs.2.63 billion for the quarter ending December 2008 – a dreadful decline by 152%. The earning per share (EPS), too, went down to a negative Rs.5.51 per share for the quarter from a healthy Rs.12.95 yoy. Its arch rivals Maruti Suzuki and Hyundai Motors posted healthy numbers at a time when Tata Motors saw a fall of 19% in total sales for the month of February. Will Tata Nano indeed be their saving grace?

At the risk of being daring, the answer to the above question, with a short term perspective, is a big NO! Tata Motors has already invested over Rs.20 billion in the Nano project so far. Although the car would be rolled out in June 2009, it won’t be sooner than 2011 that the company can ‘hope’ to start making profits out of this car. Reason: Nano is a low cost, low-margin car and therefore the company will have to rely on huge volumes to pump in profitability. However, since the manufacturing plant in Gujarat is not ready at the moment, it would be difficult to manufacture more than 3,000-4,000 cars per month initially. “We estimate Tata Motors to sell 50,000 units and 1,50,000 units of Nano in FY’10 and FY’11, respectively. Assuming realisation of Rs.1,00,000 per unit, it will add just Rs.5 billion and Rs.150 billion to the company’s sales in FY ’10 (E) and FY ’11(E) respectively, which is not very significant considering the size of Tata Motors,” points out Vaishali Jajoo, Senior Research Analyst, Angel Broking. So despite the hype that Nano is generating, it would end up spilling more red ink on the balance sheet of Tata Motors in the short run. Trade pundits have predicted that Tata Motors will have to sell at least four to five million cars to break even and make profit. Considering Nano’s rate of production, Tata Motors will be able to reach this figure only by the sixth year of operation, i.e. FY’15. Even the Nano Europa, the European version of Nano, will not be launched before 2011.


Source : IIPM Editorial, 2012.

For More IIPM Info, Visit below mentioned IIPM articles.

 
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